Relations between Russia and some of its traditional European allies have soured over its role in the Ukraine crisis. As a result, Moscow is attempting to forge new alliances in the region with smaller eastern and central European states, many of which have important trade ties with their more powerful neighbour. Now many face a tricky balancing act between their links to Russia and allegiance to Brussels

What is the story?

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, popped up in Belgrade this week for a huge military parade celebrating the anniversary of liberation from the Nazis. Serbia is one of several central and eastern European countries to make overtures to Russia in recent months, and Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have notably opposed EU sanctions over Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Owing largely to their ties with Russia in the energy and arms industries, these countries are engaged in a balancing act between Moscow and Brussels, which Russia hopes to exploit to make new alliances in the region.

How has this happened?

As Russia squared up to the west over its antics in Ukraine, several central European states expressed opposition to the sanctions the EU slapped on its big eastern adversary. Slovakia’s president, Robert Fico, recently called the sanctions a “meaningless” gesture that would jeopardise the EU economy, and Slovak officials reportedly attempted to have Russia’s deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, left off the sanctions list in March. The Czech prime minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, said a trade war and “some new economic and political Iron Curtain” would be bad for Russia and the EU. The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, went further to argue that the sanctions were like “shooting oneself in the foot” because they inflict more harm on Europe than Russia.

Even Poland, a historical foe of Russia that has lobbied for stricter sanctions and a greater Nato and US military presence in eastern Europe, recently struck a softer tone on Russia, with the new prime minister, Ewa Kopacz, promising a more pragmatic, hands-off approach to the Ukraine crisis. The Serbian prime minister, Alexander Vučić, despite his continued insistence that Serbia wants to join the EU, said after Putin’s visit that Serbia will never adopt any sanctions against Russia.

Meanwhile, some of these countries have boosted economic cooperation with Russia. Hungary has signed a €10bn loan agreement with Russia, under which Russia’s state company Rosatom will build two additional reactor blocks at the Hungarian nuclear energy plant in Paks. Slovakia, whose Miroslav Lajčák was the only EU foreign minister besides Cyprus’s to visit Moscow since the annexation of Crimea, said it expected to sign an oil-supply treaty with Russia this month that would expire in 2029. Putin reportedly discussed military cooperation and participation in Russia’s South Stream gas project with Serbia during his visit. The Russian president said trade with Serbia reached $2bn last year and was expected to be about the same this year.
The issues

Germany’s role

Germany has played a key role in Russia’s evolving foreign policy in central and eastern Europe. As the largest buyer of Russian natural gas, which is vital to Russia’s economy and federal budget, Berlin has been Moscow’s most important trade partner.

But in 2012, German-Russian relations deteriorated after Berlin’s criticism of Russia’s presidential election and crackdown on the opposition, and ties have soured even further over the Ukraine crisis. As a result, Russia has started to look for new partners among the smaller countries of central and eastern Europe, which it did not pay much attention to before, said Alexei Fenenko, a professor of international relations at Moscow State University.

“There are two types of countries in central and eastern Europe: Those who are openly hostile, who we can’t hope to work with, and those that go back and forth,” Fenenko said. “There are forces in Hungrary, Slovakia, and most recently in the Czech Republic, with which Russia can have good dialogue. The pro-Russian party in Latvia helped with this as well.”

Gas

Energy exports have been and will remain Russia’s main trump card in Europe, and 12 eastern and central EU member states rely on Moscow for more than three-quarters of their gas supplies. Russia has started construction on its end of the South Stream gas pipeline, which is to run through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria, but Bulgaria twice suspended work on the project this summer. Although Bulgarians widely approve of the project, Boyko Borisov, whose Gerb party won the country’s snap national election this month, said he would resume work on the project only with the support of the EU, which has opposed the project on the basis of anti-monopoly regulations.

Hungary, on the other hand, has eagerly promoted South Stream and would like to challenge Germany as a hub for Russian energy supplies, Fenenko said. In September, the country stopped reverse-flow gas supplies to Ukraine after Russia, the original supplier, warned that it could turn off the tap. The European commission upbraided Hungary, but Budapest was more concerned with its relationship with Russia, from which three-quarters of Hungary’s gas comes from.

Meanwhile, Hungary’s president has called Russia a model for political development and began mimicking Putin’s policies by instituting reforms that many call anti-democratic, imposing greater state involvement in key sectors of the economy, promoting government based on “Christian values” and claiming to be the protector of ethnic Hungarians in other countries.

Trade

Trade is one of the factors undoubtedly moving some countries closer to Russia. The Czech Republic’s exports of engineering equipment to Russia could be hampered by the sanctions on any technology able to be used for defence, as could Slovakia’s exports of steel tubes to Russia. Both countries’ apple industries have suffered from the embargo that Russia placed on dairy, meat and produce from countries that had adopted sanctions against it, with Czech apple prices reportedly falling by 20-30%. Poland’s fruit industry has also been heavily hit.

Nato bases in the east

Nato’s expansion eastward has long been cited by Russian leaders as a direct threat to their country’s security, and the possibility of Nato bases in central and eastern European countries has been a driving factor behind Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Moscow is trying to improve relations in regional capitals in the anticipation of negotiations over the placement of Nato forces, Fenenko said. The arrival of Nato, or even US troops, would not only reduce Russia’s influence over the region, but also threaten to heat up Russian-backed frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
Where can I find out more?

The Guardian’s New East network covers developments in former Soviet republics, while news outlets focused on EU policy, such as EurActiv, have covered Russia’s relations with member states in detail. Other continental news sources, such as the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle, have also focused heavily on Russian-European relations. Industry publications such as Fresh Plaza for the produce industry have reported on the effects of western sanctions and the Russian food import embargo.

Relations between Russia and some of its traditional European allies have soured over its role in the Ukraine crisis. As a result, Moscow is attempting to forge new alliances in the region with smaller eastern and central European states, many of which have important trade ties with their more powerful neighbour. Now many face a tricky balancing act between their links to Russia and allegiance to Brussels

What is the story?

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, popped up in Belgrade this week for a huge military parade celebrating the anniversary of liberation from the Nazis. Serbia is one of several central and eastern European countries to make overtures to Russia in recent months, and Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have notably opposed EU sanctions over Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Owing largely to their ties with Russia in the energy and arms industries, these countries are engaged in a balancing act between Moscow and Brussels, which Russia hopes to exploit to make new alliances in the region.

How has this happened?

As Russia squared up to the west over its antics in Ukraine, several central European states expressed opposition to the sanctions the EU slapped on its big eastern adversary. Slovakia’s president, Robert Fico, recently called the sanctions a “meaningless” gesture that would jeopardise the EU economy, and Slovak officials reportedly attempted to have Russia’s deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, left off the sanctions list in March. The Czech prime minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, said a trade war and “some new economic and political Iron Curtain” would be bad for Russia and the EU. The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, went further to argue that the sanctions were like “shooting oneself in the foot” because they inflict more harm on Europe than Russia.

Even Poland, a historical foe of Russia that has lobbied for stricter sanctions and a greater Nato and US military presence in eastern Europe, recently struck a softer tone on Russia, with the new prime minister, Ewa Kopacz, promising a more pragmatic, hands-off approach to the Ukraine crisis. The Serbian prime minister, Alexander Vučić, despite his continued insistence that Serbia wants to join the EU, said after Putin’s visit that Serbia will never adopt any sanctions against Russia.

Meanwhile, some of these countries have boosted economic cooperation with Russia. Hungary has signed a €10bn loan agreement with Russia, under which Russia’s state company Rosatom will build two additional reactor blocks at the Hungarian nuclear energy plant in Paks. Slovakia, whose Miroslav Lajčák was the only EU foreign minister besides Cyprus’s to visit Moscow since the annexation of Crimea, said it expected to sign an oil-supply treaty with Russia this month that would expire in 2029. Putin reportedly discussed military cooperation and participation in Russia’s South Stream gas project with Serbia during his visit. The Russian president said trade with Serbia reached $2bn last year and was expected to be about the same this year.
The issues

Germany’s role

Germany has played a key role in Russia’s evolving foreign policy in central and eastern Europe. As the largest buyer of Russian natural gas, which is vital to Russia’s economy and federal budget, Berlin has been Moscow’s most important trade partner.

But in 2012, German-Russian relations deteriorated after Berlin’s criticism of Russia’s presidential election and crackdown on the opposition, and ties have soured even further over the Ukraine crisis. As a result, Russia has started to look for new partners among the smaller countries of central and eastern Europe, which it did not pay much attention to before, said Alexei Fenenko, a professor of international relations at Moscow State University.

“There are two types of countries in central and eastern Europe: Those who are openly hostile, who we can’t hope to work with, and those that go back and forth,” Fenenko said. “There are forces in Hungrary, Slovakia, and most recently in the Czech Republic, with which Russia can have good dialogue. The pro-Russian party in Latvia helped with this as well.”

Gas

Energy exports have been and will remain Russia’s main trump card in Europe, and 12 eastern and central EU member states rely on Moscow for more than three-quarters of their gas supplies. Russia has started construction on its end of the South Stream gas pipeline, which is to run through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria, but Bulgaria twice suspended work on the project this summer. Although Bulgarians widely approve of the project, Boyko Borisov, whose Gerb party won the country’s snap national election this month, said he would resume work on the project only with the support of the EU, which has opposed the project on the basis of anti-monopoly regulations.

Hungary, on the other hand, has eagerly promoted South Stream and would like to challenge Germany as a hub for Russian energy supplies, Fenenko said. In September, the country stopped reverse-flow gas supplies to Ukraine after Russia, the original supplier, warned that it could turn off the tap. The European commission upbraided Hungary, but Budapest was more concerned with its relationship with Russia, from which three-quarters of Hungary’s gas comes from.

Meanwhile, Hungary’s president has called Russia a model for political development and began mimicking Putin’s policies by instituting reforms that many call anti-democratic, imposing greater state involvement in key sectors of the economy, promoting government based on “Christian values” and claiming to be the protector of ethnic Hungarians in other countries.

Trade

Trade is one of the factors undoubtedly moving some countries closer to Russia. The Czech Republic’s exports of engineering equipment to Russia could be hampered by the sanctions on any technology able to be used for defence, as could Slovakia’s exports of steel tubes to Russia. Both countries’ apple industries have suffered from the embargo that Russia placed on dairy, meat and produce from countries that had adopted sanctions against it, with Czech apple prices reportedly falling by 20-30%. Poland’s fruit industry has also been heavily hit.

Nato bases in the east

Nato’s expansion eastward has long been cited by Russian leaders as a direct threat to their country’s security, and the possibility of Nato bases in central and eastern European countries has been a driving factor behind Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Moscow is trying to improve relations in regional capitals in the anticipation of negotiations over the placement of Nato forces, Fenenko said. The arrival of Nato, or even US troops, would not only reduce Russia’s influence over the region, but also threaten to heat up Russian-backed frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
Where can I find out more?

The Guardian’s New East network covers developments in former Soviet republics, while news outlets focused on EU policy, such as EurActiv, have covered Russia’s relations with member states in detail. Other continental news sources, such as the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle, have also focused heavily on Russian-European relations. Industry publications such as Fresh Plaza for the produce industry have reported on the effects of western sanctions and the Russian food import embargo.