No, the European election results will resuscitate European foreign policy. That may seem counterintuitive—after all, the European Parliament is now polarized between a grand coalition of Socialists and the center-right and a bunch of radical spoilers, a situation that would seem to spell introversion and gridlock. And yet, if the parliament can’t provide the positive political change that voters have demanded, then governments will have to.

Many of the EU’s internal deals are currently sewn up by the so-called Weimar triangle. Together, France, Germany, and Poland have helped define the EU’s East-West balance (on resource disparities, budget, free movement, energy, and relations between eurozone members and nonmembers) and its North-South balance (on austerity, growth, and competitiveness).

The trio’s influence is clear in foreign policy, too: the South-East balance spawned the concept of an EU neighborhood and locked the bloc into a one-size-fits-all approach to North Africa and Eastern Europe. That balance has also led the EU to slowly abandon transatlanticism in favor of a conciliatory line toward Russia. All this is now ripe for change.

Poland, worried about the deepening relationship between leftists in Paris and Berlin, may look for allies elsewhere. So too may Germany’s Christian Democratic Chancellor Angela Merkel. And although it may seem odd to propose the commitment-phobic UK as a potential partner, Germany-Poland-Britain may just prove to be the format that finally binds London to the EU. Any such axis would shake up EU foreign policy.