Reorganizing the European Commission Into Clusters

One of the architects of European integration, Jean Monnet, once said, “Nothing is possible without men [and women, one would add today], nothing is permanent without institutions.” That is why the way the European Commission is set up for the next five years is so important. And a reorganization of the commission can help ensure that the EU is better equipped to respond to today’s serious external challenges.

In recent years, the commission has gone through paradoxical developments. On the one hand, it has gained new powers as a result of the euro crisis. The commission now monitors and enforces fiscal discipline across the eurozone under new rules aimed at reducing budget deficits and public debt. On the other hand, the commission’s lead role in driving the European integration process has weakened considerably. It remains a key player not least because it maintains a monopoly on proposing legislation, but its political authority is a pale shadow of what it used to be.

The rise of Euroskeptic populist parties that cultivate the myth of the commission as a power-hungry bureaucratic monster has also hurt the body’s image.

There are various explanations for this. Since the 1990s, the European Council has become the focal point of EU decisionmaking, reducing the lead role of the commission. This tendency was reinforced during the euro crisis, when the leaders of the largest member states asserted their dominance. Today, Merkel’s word carries much greater weight than Barroso’s. As the European public has become more skeptical toward the EU, confidence in the Brussels-based institutions has declined. There is a pervasive feeling in the European business community and the public at large that the commission tends to be hyperactive in proposing overly detailed regulations and does not sufficiently focus on key priorities. The rise of Euroskeptic populist parties that cultivate the myth of the commission as a power-hungry bureaucratic monster has also hurt the body’s image.

In addition, the massive increase in the size of the commission following the EU’s 2004 enlargement played a negative role. There are more commissioners today than relevant commission areas of jurisdiction. As every member of the commission aims for a high profile and wants to leave a mark, the proliferation of portfolios contributes to regulatory activism. Moreover, while the College of Commissioners was once a place for substantive discussions, today, with each of its 28 members named by a member state, it has become a rubber-stamping operation. Real decisionmaking happens in the context of a smaller framework, essentially among the president, the commissioner in charge of a particular dossier, and the commission’s secretary general. “Collegiality,” once a core principle of the commission’s work, has been significantly weakened.

As a result of these trends, many commissioners tend to regard themselves primarily as representatives of “the state they know best” (the politically correct way to refer to their home country). This contradicts the very concept of the European Commission. When taking office, every commissioner takes an oath “to be completely independent in carrying out . . . [his] responsibilities, in the general interest of the Union.”

The obvious remedy would be to reduce the size of the commission to the number of significant tasks. The member states have not agreed to this, and they are not likely to do so. But now might be the right time to resort to another idea that could considerably improve the functioning of the commission—namely to reorganize it on the basis of clusters.

In a cluster-based system, each member state would continue to nominate a commissioner, but the portfolios would be grouped in five to seven topically related clusters centered on key commission tasks, such as external relations, economy, citizenship, natural resources, and administration. Every cluster would be headed by one vice president of the commission. Whereas the position of vice president has so far been little more than an honorific title, the new vice presidents should have real authority in overseeing the work within a cluster, including having to agree to place an item on the commission’s agenda.

This system would enable the commission to coordinate better among related areas, set strategic direction, improve decisionmaking, and reduce the urge toward excessive regulation. Collegiality among commissioners—at present a fairly empty concept—would be enhanced, as real teamwork within the various clusters would be encouraged.

Such a significant structural reform of the commission would no doubt be controversial. A new president might see the idea of empowering vice presidents as a threat to his or her prerogatives.

However, this would be shortsighted. Like in a private-sector corporation, a stronger top management team working under the commission president’s direct guidance would ultimately enhance his or her authority. A revamped setup could address concerns from smaller states that the vice presidents would all come from big countries by rotating the vice presidents among member states (except in external relations) every two and a half years. It should also be made clear that all commissioners would continue to be equal when it comes to participation in collegiate decisionmaking.

While reorganizing the entire commission on the basis of clusters would be useful, it can be argued that on external relations in particular, it is actually necessary and even prescribed in the EU’s treaty. That document charges the high representative with ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external action and coordinating its various aspects. Yet this provision has not been fully implemented during the past five years. Barroso did not empower Ashton to assume this coordinating role. Her hat as a vice president of the commission has remained largely ornamental. The various commissioners dealing with EU external relations have met rarely and hardly ever under her chairmanship. In fact, they have operated mostly autonomously, with only limited and ad hoc coordination.

In the new commission, the external relations cluster, encompassing trade, development, the neighborhood, enlargement, and humanitarian assistance, should meet regularly under the direct authority of the high representative. Commissioners dealing with internal competences that have major external dimensions, such as justice and home affairs (migration) or the environment (climate change), should be associated to this work as necessary. A secretariat composed of officials from the EEAS and the Secretariat General of the Commission should prepare meetings.